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FINANCIAL DEPTH OF THE BRIC: THE RUSSIAN DIMENSION 
Abstract 
The purpose of the article is to assess the financial depth of the Russian economy in the BRIC 
context. Russian financial market is evaluated by a set of key indicators that characterize the 
level of maturity of the national financial system in respect to international standards. This 
task is implemented through descriptive analysis of extensive international data generated 
from a time series covering the period of 1995-2010. The paper demonstrates that in 
comparison to other BRIC countries, the financial depth of the Russian economy may be 
characterised as inadequate. In the Russian financial market potential for growth is combined 
with exceptionally high risks. Insufficient depth undermines its long-term competitiveness 
and exacerbates its exposure to shocks in the international market. 
Keywords: Russia, Emerging Market Economies, Financial Depth, Financial Market, BRIC.  
Introduction 
This paper has as its central theme the assessment of the financial depth (otherwise known as 
completeness of the domestic financial markets) of Russia in relation to other BRIC 
countries. This is motivated by two considerations. First, whilst interest in emerging markets 
led by the BRIC countries has been growing fast (see Kearney, 2012 for comprehensive 
review), there is still a question mark over the actual degree of similarity of conditions in this 
group of countries. Comparative analysis of their financial markets is one area that has not 
received adequate coverage. As noted by Dorrucci et al. (2009), there have been no major 
attempts to quantify parameters of financial development in emerging markets. Christian and 
Pagoulato (2007) agree, pointing at the need of further research to identify the determinants 
of domestic financial development in emerging market economies. This paper will seek to 
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shed light on the issue of homogeneity of BRIC as far as their financial systems are 
concerned. Second, the comparative approach has been chosen because meaningful 
representation of the financial depth is only possible when the parameters of one system are 
projected on characteristics present in other economies.   
 
The investigation of financial depth in Russia and other BRIC countries is topical because, 
even though these countries are not a prevailing factor of the global financial market as yet, 
they are a growing force within the global financial system. Their unsettled financial markets 
may either present an inherent instability threats for the global financial markets, or, instead, 
act as safety valve for the global financial flows, reducing the volatility of the global financial 
system. In this respect, the analysis of the relative financial depth of the BRIC countries is 
significant because it helps to better understand the causes of the fragility of the global 
financial sector and consequently to mitigate their impact (Beck, et al. 2010).  
 
Russia will be compared both to BRIC countries and to some leading world economies in 
order to evaluate the readiness of the Russian financial market to support economic growth in 
the country in the near future. By looking at the example of economies acknowledged as 
international powerhouses one may attempt to deduce the characteristics of the financial 
market that have beneficial effect on economic growth and competitiveness at various stages 
of national economic development, as well as to establish which characteristic corresponds to 
any particular stage. For this reason comparative assessment of the financial markets of 
Russia in the context of BRIC does not only have interest for academics specializing on 
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emerging markets, but also for politicians and practitioners who can make a meaningful 
judgment on the performance and risk factors related to the emerging markets in question.  
 
Financial markets will be evaluated with the help of a set of key parameters that characterize 
the level of maturity of the national financial system in respect to international standards, its 
stability and level of associated risks and the ability of the financial system to perform its 
functions without producing deformities. 
 
This task will be implemented though descriptive analysis of extensive international data 
generated from a time series covering the period from 1995, when the Russian financial 
market established itself, up to 2010. The study draws on the statistics and official forecasts 
of global economic trends and the economic performance of individual countries prepared by 
IMF, ECB, OECD, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the International 
Energy Agency; by industry associations, renowned research centres and consultancies. We 
also employ the statistics and forecasts published by Russian ministries and state 
departments, monetary authorities and national research centres. 
 
Financial depth 
The paper is based on the premise that the financial sector is a critical element of the modern 
market economy responsible for improving the economy’s ability to manage risk and allocate 
capital, and in doing so, to increase overall efficiency of business1. Literature indicates 
(Levine, 1997; Stiglitz, et al., 2010) that in a long term an efficient financial sector translates 
                                            
1 For a critical survey and evaluation of the literature on finance and growth, see Wachtel, 2003. 
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into the increased outputs of the economic performance, as better management of risk enables 
the economy to take greater chances while obtaining a higher return on operations. In 
addition, greater financial depth translates into a sustainable growth model as the financial 
market works as a mechanism for driving capital to its most efficient use (Bonin & Wachtel, 
2003; Rousseau & Wachtel, 2005). At the same time, poorly performing financial market 
may cause serious problems for economic growth and national competitiveness (Levine & 
Zervos, 1998; Levine, et al., 2000; Miller, 1998). It follows, therefore, that without the 
assessment of the state of the BRIC’s financial markets the full picture of the developmental 
capacity of their economies may not be complete. In turn, such assessment cannot be 
implemented without recourse to international comparisons. There are no absolute measures 
that may be used to determine the maturity of a financial system in isolation. Only 
international comparisons allow to identify relations between different measures and 
characteristics of the financial market and positive macroeconomic developments. 
 
In a nutshell financial depth may be defined as the ability of the financial system to supply 
funds to the government and the private sector (Caballero & Krishnamurth, 2004). Sufficient 
financial depth signifies that the economy enjoys an ample provision of money, securities, 
financial instruments and institutions and is endowed with more advantageous conditions for 
long-term economic growth and modernisation. Determining financial depth would require 
the assessment of the permeation of the economy with financial tools and relations. Financial 
depth reflects the compatibility between the volumes of production and the size and structure 
of the financial sector in terms of savings, investments, and redistributive mechanisms. 
Financial depth also reveals the level of development of financial markets in terms of the 
efficiency of financial intermediation (Honohan, 2004). The greater the financial depth, the 
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more significant is the ability of the financial sector to reallocate financial resources in 
support of economic development (Klein & Olive, 2008).  There is hardly any discord in the 
literature regarding the necessity of the economy to develop certain financial depth in order to 
function smoothly. This does not mean though that the same depth suits all. Literature 
predicts that financial markets in the emerging economies may pursue developmental 
trajectories that defy the conventions (Andersen et al., 2012; King & Levine, 1993; Mirkin, 
2011a). To Stiglitz et al. (2010), however, the disproportionality of the financial markets is 
always worrisome, suggesting that they fail to fully provide the services required by the 
economy. 
 
Commonly used comparative measurements of financial depth employ a variety of financial 
indicators such as the structure of the money supply, stock market capitalisation, private and 
public bond market capitalisation, etc.; also widely used are indices that represent certain 
parameters, for example, capitalisation or money stock, as a proportion of GDP (Khan & 
Senhadji, 2000). In this study as the first step we examine a range of key financial indicators 
of the Russian market to determine its position in relation to other BRIC markets as well as 
some leading international markets. This will allow us to reach certain conclusions about the 
state of the market, the degree of its maturity and, eventually, the prospects of its integration 
into the international financial environment.  
 
It is appropriate at this point to provide some background information on the development of 
the Russian financial system during the period of post-communist transition. Under central 
planning the economy consisted of two major segments: the consumer market that was 
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monetised and the producer goods market that can be regarded as what Yi (1991) calls semi-
monetized because, although producer goods had prices, these prices and the allocation of 
goods were regulated by the plan outside the market. The instantaneous liberalisation of 
prices in January 1992 sent shock waves throughout the economy as demand for liquid assets 
and financial intermediations had shot up overnight. Removal of the Soviet-era price control 
made apparent the monetary overhang inherited from the Soviet period and caused 
hyperinflation exacerbated by excessive money emission. This resulted in the near 
bankruptcy of much of Russian industry and forced the government to restrict new emission 
drastically. During the 1990s the developments in the financial system were reflecting the 
progress (or lack of it) of the general market reforms and institutional building in Russia and 
their economic consequences, including budget deficit, high interest rate, rampant inflation, 
artificial and fixed exchange rate, dependence on the exports of raw materials, etc. 
 
During the second half of the 1990s, the Russian capital market acquired the features of an 
emerging market similar to the financial markets of some newly industrialized and 
developing countries in Latin America and South-East Asia (Claessens, et al., 2000). Its 
emerging status was reflected in such characteristics as a relatively limited range of 
instruments, low liquidity and operational volumes, dependence on international investors, 
high volatility (for more details see Kuznetsova, et al., 2011). During this period profound 
dependence upon the short-term and long-term fluctuations of the global economy and the 
poor state of the national economy were making the Russian financial market highly unstable 
and susceptible to manipulation and speculative attacks. The greatest turmoil followed the 
default of the Russian state on its short-term bonds in August 1998. The immediate 
consequences were dire, which was not surprising considering that government bonds were 
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responsible for 85% of the market’s turnover. The capital market was almost destroyed as up 
to 50% of traders stopped operating and the state had revoked nearly 90% of professional 
licenses. The corporate market was affected as well. Three leading industrial holdings – 
Sidanko Oil, Svyazinvest Telecommunications and Norilsk Nickel – saw their market 
capitalisation collapsing from the peak of about $31 billion in October 1997 to $3.8 billion a 
year later (Fox & Heller, 1999). In the end, however, the market has emerged from this 
calamity as a stronger entity. The ‘natural selection’ diminished the number of players from 
447 in October 1998 to 106 in December 2001, as only the largest and the strongest were able 
to stay in the market.  
 
Russia’s recovery from the August 1998 financial crash was surprisingly quick. The main 
reason for this speedy revival and fast and steady growth until the financial crisis of 2008 was 
the rapid growth of world oil prices, allowing Russia to run a large trade surplus and increase 
investments into the economy. Between 1998 and 2006 the Russian Trading System Index 
(RTSI), which has been widely accepted as the official benchmark and indicator of the 
dynamics of the trading in the Russian stock market, grew about 40 times, with the turnover 
increasing 55 times. One of the principal outcomes of the development of the Russian 
financial sector during the last decade was that the capital market has grown to become the 
largest amongst Russia’s main competitors – the countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. Currently it generates 65–75% of the regional turnover of securities. At the 
same time, the market remains highly volatile, with great proclivity for speculative activities; 
it depends heavily upon the operations of non-residents and characterises by a large-scale 
state participation and influence. The market is not attractive for small residential investors: 
less than two per cent of the population hold shares or mortgages (Rutland 2008); as a result 
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the largest domestic companies are financed from abroad and are served predominantly by 
the Western investment banks. 
 
Assessing Financial Depth 
The aspects of financial depth that we are assessing are monetisation, market capitalisation, 
banking activity and the state of financial services. 
 
Monetisation of the economy 
Although publications on monetary issues in the BRIC countries often refer to monetisation, 
the term remains somewhat vague because it has a variety of applications. In this paper we 
follow the tradition set by development economics that defines monetisation as the 
enlargement of the sphere of monetary economy (Chandavarkar, 1977). A link between 
economic growth, the financial market and monetisation is well established in the literature 
(Berthelemy & Varoudakis, 1996): expansion of money in the economy increases the 
mobility of resources by enabling the transfer of funds from one sector to another, stimulates 
demand, diminishes the cost of transactions and improves access to capital. Monetisation is 
among the most important characteristics of economic development, but is very difficult to 
measure. In theory, monetisation should describe the volume of transactions involving 
monetary instruments in the economy. However, because of the complexity of modern 
economies and shortage of data, it is not always possible to determine this volume (Yi, 1991), 
making it necessary to turn to proxies. One widely used indirect measure of monetisation is 
the proportion of liquidity, composed of currency in circulation and demand deposits plus 
time deposits in domestic currency, plus deposits denominated by foreign currencies, to GDP. 
It is easy to calculate and is widely available, making it useful for cross-national 
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comparisons. However, it is far from being ideal. On its own, monetary growth is not 
necessarily a reliable indicator of a greater financial depth. For example, Yi (1991) has found 
that growth of money supply may be seen as a sign of increasing monetisation only if it does 
not result in inflation. However, because of our focus on comparative financial depth, in this 
paper we do not look at the dynamics of monetisation, but consider its level. 
 
The levels of monetisation in BRIC and other countries are presented in Table 12. In 
developed economies monetisation, as a rule, is higher than 60% of GDP; three-quarters of 
the developed countries have monetisation level above 80% of GDP. Monetisation in Russia 
reached its maximum rate in 2009 when it stood at 49.5%. At the time, this figure was sill  
nearly five times lower than in Japan, three times smaller than in China and Canada, and 
almost two times less than in the United States. The spread among the BRIC countries is 
wide: while China features among a small group of countries with the highest level of 
monetisation and Brazil and India are in the middle bracket, Russia is positioned among the 
countries with a low monetisation level. This is a noteworthy anomaly: the data suggest that 
the degree of monetisation we observe in Russia is typical of countries that in terms of 
economic development and per capita income are generally far below Russia.  
Table 1 about here 
The contrast between monetisation and other economic parameters in Russia has historical 
roots. The “shock therapy” that was applied to the Soviet economy during the initial period of 
reforms had found businesses completely unprepared and provoked major disruptions of links 
                                            
2 There is no established convention for the designation of “developed” and “developing” countries. According 
to common practice, we include in the first group Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern 
America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the eurozone 
countries, except Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia, in Europe. 
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between supplies and buyers as well as rampant inflation. This caused a crisis of liquidity that 
forced firms to introduce barter transactions on a great scale: by 1998 they represented up to 
51% of all turnover (Kuznetsova, et al., 2011). Further reasons indicated by Russian experts 
include lack of confidence in economic policy, poor investment climate, uncertain prospects 
of economic growth, insufficient propensity to save (Gavrilenkov, 2004). In addition, it is 
essential to convince wealthy Russians to keep money in the Russian financial system, rather 
than offshore. This is not an easy task: the 1998 default and the expropriation of bank 
deposits that followed has done little to increase general trust in the legal tender in the 
country and exerted a depressing effect on all financial activities. What really matters long-
term, however, is that the decade of a relatively stable and successful development that was 
only interrupted by the 2008 crisis did little in terms of speeding up the monetisation of the 
economy. It expanded, from 16-20% of the GDP in mid 1990s to 22% or slightly less than 
$80 billion in 2002 (Kuznetsova, et al., 2011), at a pace that was far inferior to the growth in 
economy, which surged by 40% over the same period. This situation may be seen as a serious 
competitive weakness of the Russian financial market in comparison to other BRIC countries 
that now outperform Russia in this category (Table 2).  
Table 2 about here 
Low monetisation is fraught with problems. Thus, it forces the government to adhere to tight 
fiscal policy because of fear that even a small emission would immediately accelerate 
inflation. Low monetisation makes the country vulnerable to the movement of speculative 
capital. Inflows or outflows even of a few billion dollars may destabilise the cash-strapped 
Russian financial system. Low monetisation also undermines the resource base of the 
financial sector and may inhibit growth perspectives because of over-reliance on short-term 
investments of financial non-residents, inflated price of money in the economy, the low 
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capitalisation of the resident banks. All these limit the consumer spending and create 
inducement for capital flight.  
 
A by-product of low monetisation has been the spontaneous dollarization of the Russian 
economy that shows the share of funds held by households and companies in foreign 
exchange. This was an attempt on the part of residents and businesses to hedge high risks of 
political and economic uncertainty by using hard currency, initially US dollars and later 
increasingly the euro, in formal and informal transaction. In the dollarization league table, 
comprised by the Moscow International Institute of Econometrics using the methodology of 
the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research, Russia is positioned immediately after Latin 
American countries that lead the table and far ahead of China (Izvestia, 15.04.2005). It is 
believed that during the first two decades of transition Russia’s population has become the 
world’s largest holder of dollars outside the USA. According to the US Treasury, in early 
2000 Russia had accumulated more than 40% of all exported US dollars and more than 10% 
of the total mass of the dollars in the world-wide circulation including the USA (US 
Treasury, 2000). Unofficial dollarization destabilizes money supply and limits the 
effectiveness of monetary policies and exchange rate interventions. Equally consequential is 
that foreign cash transactions reduce the costs of tax evasion and facilitate participation in the 
“grey” economy. By obscuring financial transactions, currency substitution reduces the cost 
of enterprise theft and facilitates corruption and rent seeking (Feige & Dean, 2002), the two 
“vices” that are widely spread in Russia. 
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Another striking feature of the money supply in Russia is the existence of vast official foreign 
currency reserves. They stand close to 40% of the GDP and appear excessive in comparison 
to most other countries. According to our calculations, in 2007, 83-85% of the developing 
countries maintained the level of international reserves to GDP at less than 30%. The 
developed countries kept it even lower, on average between 3 and 5%. If we focus on BRIC 
alone, however, Russia stops looking like an exception. Brazil and India closely follow 
Russia by value of reserves; however, China is in the lead with the largest foreign exchange 
reserves in the world. The literature claims that the general objective of this accumulation has 
been to resist or delay currency appreciation (Mohanti & Turner, 2006). From the point of 
view of financial depth, the existence of disproportionate reserves may evidence that the local 
financial systems have difficulty in properly channelling domestic savings to investment 
either because of a savings “glut” as in China or of an investment “drought” (e.g. Russia) 
(ECB, 2006). 
 
Finally, an important characteristic of monetisation is the structure of money supply. A long-
established trend has been a decrease in the proportion of cash in circulation. Worldwide the 
indicator “currency in circulation in the monetary base,” that averaged 40% in 1980, fell to 
30% in 2007 (Beck & Demirgüc-Kunt, 2009). In the overwhelming majority of developed 
economies the cash component tends to be under 8% (Table 3). In one third of them this 
figure is less than 4%. Meanwhile, in three-quarters of developing countries banknotes 
exceed 10% of the nominal money stock, and in approximately a third of them their share is 
greater than 20%.  
Table 3 about here 
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In Russia the share of cash in money stock (broad money) reached 23.7% in 2010. This 
places Russia firmly in the group of lesser developed countries and sizably below the rest of 
the BRIC group. By contrast, China and Brazil are in the same group as the United States and 
Switzerland. On a positive side, according to some expert estimates (Vedev, 2010), the share 
of cash in money supply in Russia has been steadily declining and is expected to approach 
15-17% in 2020. Even then, it will be elevated by the standards prevailing in developed 
economies. In this context, a high proportion of cash in circulation in Russia sends a strong 
signal that, ceteris paribus, one deals with a lesser developed financial sector and an 
economy in which the informal segment plays a greater role.  Accordingly, such structure of 
money supply is often associated in literature with high political risk, flaccid social relations, 
lack of trust in financial institutions, high systemic risk, and general economic frailty (Mirkin, 
2011c; Petryk, 1998). 
 
Market capitalisation 
There is a direct link between monetisation of economy and the development of securities 
market and the amount of resources redistributed through it (Table 4). Increase in 
monetisation encourages a steady trend towards diversification of the financial market, an 
increase of its size and liquidity, ensures risk reduction and the emergence of new segments 
and innovative financial products. For countries like Russia, in which the population has no 
established tradition of owning financial assets and trading in them, greater monetisation 
creates a platform for the massification of the securities market. In 2009, nearly two decades 
after the launch of mass privatisation, the percentage of the Russian population owning 
shares, at 0.14%, was one of the lowest in the world. To compare, in Brazil this share was 
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1.62%, in India – 2.0% and in China – 5.9%, which was still a long distance away from the 
most developed economies where it varied between 12.5% in Germany and 30.75% in Japan 
(Grout, et al. 2009).  
Table 4 about here 
The size of the securities market (the share price times the number of shares outstanding) as 
reflected in market value is known as capitalisation. Capitalisation is an important parameter 
of the financial depth (Bonin & Wachtel, 2003); however, considering its value alone is not 
enough to characterize a market as advanced and efficient or otherwise. In fact, the size of 
stock markets varies considerably even in countries with quite similar economic structure, 
performance and per capita GDP, reflecting different historical paths that their financial 
systems have followed: some of them are “bank-oriented”, others are “securities-oriented”. 
For example, within the pre-enlargement EU Austria had the smallest stock market in relative 
terms with a capitalisation of 17% of GDP and Finland had the largest one with a 
capitalisation of 286% (Blum, 2002). Besides, the volume of capitalisation may change very 
quickly. With capitalisation of €1.02 billion, at the beginning of 2008 the Russian financial 
market was ahead of all Central and Eastern European counterparts and getting close to the 
markets of Germany and Spain. By the end of the same year, however, the combined trading 
at the Russian exchanges had fallen by more than 70%, making Russia one of the world’s 
worst performers over this period (Rosner, 2008). This illustrates the difficulty of achieving a 
meaningful international comparison of the value of the securities market.  
 
The market capitalisation to GDP (MCAP/GDP) ratio is often used as an important indicator 
of the financial depth and the relative level of maturity of a market. It equals the market 
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capitalisation at the end of the year divided by GDP for the year. The result is the percentage 
of GDP that represents stock market value. As a rule, MCAP/GDP ratio rises with per capita 
GDP and is seen as a measure of the available investment potential of public equity market. 
The issue here is that there is no agreement regarding the optimal level of this index. In 
addition, it is susceptible to extreme fluctuation. For the US market, to take one example, the 
historical average since 1924 has been around 65%. However, the actual oscillation was quite 
intense with the lowest point at about 35% in 1982 and the highest point at 153% in 2000.  
Figure 1 about here 
Against this background the convulsive changes of this index in modern Russia may not 
necessarily look out of ordinary (Figure 1). Yet, a closer look reveals some notable 
differences. The first one relates to a very unbalanced industrial structure of the Russian stock 
market. Six industries, led by oil and gas, cover 90.1% of the national capitalisation, whilst 
such important industries as machine building, transport and chemical have almost no 
representation at the stock market. This means that the dynamics of capitalisation are 
excessively influenced by forces that are not representative of large sections of business. 
Second, because gas and oil are the two main exports of Russia, the stock market 
capitalisation structure seems to correlate quite closely with the Russia’s export structure, 
which makes it highly sensitive to exogenous shocks such as movements in global 
commodity prices (Vaatanen, 2000). For the same reason market capitalisation/GDP ratio 
tends to be strongly affected by the movement of “hot money”, i.e. short-term speculative 
investment from abroad: in 2004 – 2007 non-residents were responsible for 60-70% of total 
turnover in the bond and stock market.  In effect, in Russia behind impressive capitalisation 
figures hides an investment model that is typical of emerging markets, according to which the 
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largest domestic companies are financed mainly from abroad and have limited contacts with 
resident investors.  
 
Banking activity 
Two of the traditional measurements of the financial depth are related to banking (King & 
Levine, 1993). The first compares the roles of the central bank and the commercial banks on 
the assumption that private banks are likely to offer better risk management and investment 
information services than central banks, and therefore the domination of deposit banks may 
be seen as a sign of greater financial depth. In the Russian banking, however, the central bank 
is a principle force controlling a very high proportion of financial flows. The share of its 
assets in money supply fluctuates between 40 and 50 per cent. This is almost twice as high as 
in the developed countries, and noticeably more than in Brazil, India and China. This 
dominance weakens the role of commercial and investment banks as financial intermediaries 
and limits their ability to increase own operating capacity.  
 
The second measurement is the ratio of bank claims on other sectors and other depository 
corporations to GDP. In terms of this ratio, Russia is behind all other BRIC countries. The 
gap is even greater in comparison to the developed market economies (Table 5). There, this 
ratio normally exceeds 100%, whilst in Russia it is in the region of 40-45%. 
Table 5 about here 
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In addition to the two measurements discussed above it is appropriate to consider bank 
leverage, defined as the ratio between liabilities and own capital of the banking sector, as an 
important characteristic of the potential of this sector to support the real economy. Leverage 
demonstrates the ability of banks to mobilise resources necessary for economic development. 
It is also an indicator of public trust towards banks. Again, as with previous measurements, 
the Russian banks demonstrate middling results, which put them on par with Turkey and 
Argentina, but behind not only developed countries but China as well (Mirkin, 2011a). 
 
Financial services 
Alongside the quantitative measures, the financial depth also has a qualitative aspect related 
to the range, breadth, reach and the volume of services provided by the financial market 
(Honohan, 2004). These reflect the density and coherence of the financial relations developed 
in the country. The quality of the financial market, being among the pillars of the national 
competitiveness, declares itself through the degree of sophistication of financial instruments, 
the multidimensionality of the market structure and the accessibility of the services 
(Kuznetsova, et al., 2011). There is evidence that Russia is not performing well in this 
department. In terms of financial market sophistication and the easiness of access to equity 
market the 2009-2010 World Economic Forum Report places Russia the 92nd and 96th 
respectively out of 133 countries (World Economic Forum, 2009). In turn, the 2011-2012 
Global Competitiveness Report lists Russia the 127th out of 142 countries in the section that 
describes the development of financial markets. By contrast, in the same section China is 
ranked the 48th, Brazil – 43rd, India – 21nd (World Economic Forum, 2011). Regarding 
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access to financial services Russia, in the 119th position, is once again far behind other BRIC 
countries. 
 
In practical terms, the facts present the financial market in Russia as not being sufficiently 
diversified or inclusive. In 2010, 92.7% of all financial assets were in the hands of the banks. 
By comparison, for 16 developed countries this share on average was close to 66% and was 
the lowest in the US at 27.7% (Mirkin, 2011a). The presence of banks in Russia is high even 
by the standards of the developing countries. This may be seen as a deficiency because the 
prevailing view in the literature is that stock markets make a superior contribution to real 
output compared to banks (Blum, et al., 2002)3. Concentration of control over assets is 
mirrored by the concentration of capitalisation and the turnover in the Russian stock market. 
In late 2007, just ten issuers accounted for more than 63% of the overall capitalisation 
(NAUFOR, 2008). Most stocks lack liquidity and the essential part of the turnover falls on a 
limited number of a few actively traded shares. In all dealings across all Russian exchanges in 
2007, top ten liquid stocks accounted for 90.8% of the overall turnover; 30 most liquid stocks 
account for 98,9%. This level of concentration is extremely high if compared to other stock 
markets. In essence, Russia still relies on a poorly diversified and weakly integrated financial 
market, more typical of a developing country. 
 
There are other symptoms of a relative immaturity of the Russian financial services. In 
developed countries that are not international financial centres financial services on average 
produce 5-8% of the gross value added in national accounts. In Russia the share of financial 
                                            
3 One notable exception is Fink and Haiss (1999) who found some evidence that during early stages of post-
communist transition stock market expansion can have a detrimental effect on real output.  
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services in gross value added remains relatively low at about 4% (Mirkin, 2011a). On a 
positive side, in the period between the 1998 and the 2008 crises the contribution of the 
financial sector towards the national GDP increased from the level of 0.5-0.6% (ibid). Such a 
rapid growth could have not be achieved without the financial services enhancing the scope 
and availability of their products. 
 
Limitations to development of the profundity of financial market 
Over the last twenty years the Russian financial sector has been growing at a frantic pace. 
Importantly, it gradually increased its share in terms of both the volume of trade and 
capitalisation in respect to the other BRIC countries and other competitors. But this growth, 
as we have seen, has rather shaky foundations. There is a potentially dangerous controversy 
in the Russian securities sector as it combines high capacity for capitalisation with 
insufficient depth. This makes the market inherently unstable as investors find themselves 
confronted with elevated risks. This has implications for their strategy. On the one hand, 
investors expect high returns to compensate for the risk4; on the other, they seek to avoid 
long-term commitment. This makes the Russian market highly volatile, with great proclivity 
for speculative activities. Within a bigger picture, this amounts to a dangerous situation: 
because of the low monetisation of the economy the withdrawal of just a few billion dollars is 
capable of producing extremely serious consequences both for the investment market and the 
economy as a whole. This situation is reflected in the very high degree of volatility in the 
Russian stock market, as illustrated by Figure 2.  
Figure 2 about here 
                                            
4 These expectations are not ungrounded: the Russian market offers a very high return. One dollar invested on 
the RTS in 1994 would bring the return of $117 in 2009. The same investment in China would return $26, in 
Brazil $58 and in India $75. 
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The RTSI reveals that the spread between high and low exceeds 50% in almost every single 
calendar year. Under these conditions foreign investors fail to bring to the Russian market so 
much needed commitment. Currently, the operations on the Russian financial market 
are dominated by the short-term speculative transactions, making the market vulnerable to 
and highly dependable on the behaviour of non-resident traders. This was demonstrated by 
2008 events when heavy capital flight caused a crisis in Russia’s stock market. On October 6, 
within a few hours, the RTS Index had registered its greatest fall in history – 19.1%, when 
trade was suspended. Characteristically, the Russian market has contracted more than its US 
counterpart, demonstrating its systemic weakness: domination of non-residents cause the 
stock market collapse or grow irrespectively to the domestic economic situation. 
Interestingly, in crisis the Russian financial system performed weaker than other BRIC 
countries as witnessed by the fall of portfolio investment of up to 70%, against Brazil’s 50% 
and India’s 30%; while China even showed growth of about 10%. In 2008 Russia performed 
much worse than practically all of the developing world and the emerging markets. It is 
important to remember that, in the case of Russia, a significant cohort of “foreign” investors 
consists of country’s residents who hide their capital on offshore accounts and then reinvest it 
in the Russian market. This category of investors is likely to be particularly sensitive to local 
institutional risks that may not be fully shared by global investors. This can be a factor that 
augments the vulnerability of the Russian financial system and increases uncertainty 
surrounding its performance. 
 
The “boom and bust” nature of the Russian securities market has wider implications evident 
from the comparison of the foreign investment patterns in Russia and China in terms of the 
proportion between portfolio and direct investment. Portfolio investments by non-residents 
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saturate economy with money and help capitalisation. At the same time, in countries with 
unbalanced financial systems, they increase the risk of speculative attacks, financial 
“bubbles”, capital flight and market shocks (Kaltenbrunner, 2012). Halligan (2012) notes that 
typically investors involved in FDI are much better informed about the relative merits of 
doing business in a country of choice than portfolio investors, making them far more 
susceptible to “fads” and alarmist newspaper headlines. Meanwhile, the prevalence of direct 
investment is associated with economic stability, higher rates of growth and economic 
modernisation. Experts emphasize that for developing economies FDI are particularly 
beneficial as they may lead to the transfer of intellectual property, technological and technical 
expertise, managerial know-how, modern standards of business culture, other relevant 
knowledge that contributes to economic growth, welfare and modernisation (UNCTAD, 2010). 
From this perspective, China has a palpable advantage, showing a greater proportion of direct 
investment in total foreign assets in comparison to Russia (Table 6). Between 1994 and 2007, 
foreign portfolio investments in Russia were higher or equal to FDI for 13 years in a row. 
Only in 2008, when the crisis caused the exodus of speculative capital from the country, the 
ratio between foreign direct and portfolio investment showed an improvement. 
Table 6 about here 
Financial depth is not an isolated variable. It reflects the state of many economic and 
institutional parameters. One of them is the valuation of the national currency, which has 
important consequences for economic development. Currently, the exchange rate of the ruble 
moves within a relatively narrow corridor with the coefficient of variation within 8-10%. This 
is not dissimilar to the exchange rate “corridor” characteristic of the developed countries. In 
Russia, however, the exchange rate is more a product of the state intervention than market 
forces. One consequence is the split “scissors” effect between the nominal and the effective 
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exchange rate, which stimulates the inflow of speculative capital. Because the influence of 
supply and demand of funds on the exchange rate is smoothened by the state, foreign 
operators of “hot money” can take full advantage of a high yield of financial assets inside 
Russia while avoiding some of the risks. The combination of a relatively stable national 
currency and high yield makes the Russian domestic financial market, which still has a 
relatively small turnover, easy to overheat. 
 
While the dominant presence of foreign investors has been a factor that destabilizes the 
Russian bond and stock market in the face of adverse developments abroad, it is evident clear 
that the Russian capital market has been hit particularly hard by the 2008 crisis mainly due to 
the inherent weaknesses of the Russian economy in general. Many of the flaws of the 
securities market, such as limited links with the real sector (only 300 of 50,000 public 
corporations in Russia are quoted in the stock exchange (Rubtsov, 2006: 20)), lack of 
diversification, and the excessive concentration of power, are a continuation of the problems 
of the national economy as a whole with its shortage of modern investment opportunities, 
weak internal market and volatile prices. 
 
Positive changes in the economic environment contribute to gains that augment financial 
depth. Other things being equal, inflation statistics is a good indicator of the health of the 
economy. Low levels of inflation are a signal of a relatively balanced economy endowed with 
incentives and resources for growth, savings and investment. The use the inflation dynamics 
in assessing the performance of BRIC allows to see once again a notable gap between this 
group and the leaders of the industrialized world, where the level of inflation is on average 
two to five times lower. Within the BRIC group, however, there is no uniformity. China, 
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Brazil and, to a lesser extent, India show much healthier inflation dynamics than Russia 
(Table 7).  A sustained inflation has been a feature of her economy since the beginning of the 
market reforms, reflecting persistent imbalances in the economic system. Some of them are 
manifestation of the problems with insufficient financial depth. High inflation causes capital 
flight, which, in turn, creates a shortage of financial resources. This prompts more 
regulations, resulting in ever increasing regulatory burden that pushes prices up and scares 
investors. 
Table 7 about here 
Continuous inflation is just one of the systemic factors that make the Russian financial 
market grapple with instability. Political uncertainties, corruption, weak enforcement of 
regulations are some others that affect the financial depth of the economy. But there is one 
aspect of the business environment that appears to be of particular importance. It is political 
risk, a permanent stress-factor that can easily lead to the isolation of the Russian market in 
the long-term and undermine its performance in the short-term. The strong and expanding 
presence of the state in the economy and the financial markets is an undeniable cause of 
anxiety among all categories of non-residential investors. Ultimately, this drags down the 
ratings of the Russian market, together with other factors, including increasing regulatory 
pressures, problems with ruble convertibility, price control and other restrictive policies in 
general. 
 
Conclusions 
For centuries the global financial markets have been operating as oligopoly, with a handful of 
international financial centres acting as major providers of the financial resources and 
operations worldwide. Regional and local centres were firmly positioned on the periphery of 
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the global system. Self-centred and limited in scope due to inability to initiate “long money” 
and the general lack of financial sophistication, they were expected to play a subordinate role.  
This situation is about to change. The BRIC countries have joined the race for the global 
economic dominance and they aspire to have financial markets to match. And yet, in the 
characteristics of their financial depth, the BRIC economies have little in common, indicating 
that the catchy acronym has severe deficiencies as an analytical platform.  
 
The growth demonstrated by the Russian market in the last ten years is in many respects 
unparalleled. However, the inherent volatility of the market has remained extraordinary as 
well: the coefficient of volatility increased from 30% in 2007 to 85% in 2009. This evidences 
that in Russia a promising potential for growth is combined with exceptionally high risks. 
Alongside other factors, some economic and some institutional, this undermines the long-
term competitiveness of the national financial market and delays its progress towards 
achieving a leading position in the international hierarchy. Crucially, this situation keeps 
Russian financial system in a stand-by mode for a possible meltdown because, as we have 
seen, the non-residents who are responsible for the bulk of the total turnover of the bond and 
stock markets, but are hardly controllable, can easily trigger a chain reaction in the financial 
market.  
 
Our analysis depicts the Russian financial market in its present state as almost certainly not 
the strongest contender in either the BRIC group or in comparison to the leading financial 
powerhouses. It shows some impressive quantitative and qualitative gains but at the same 
time suffers from developmental “diseases” which act as barriers to robust and stable growth. 
The size of the Russian financial market and the speed at which it grows makes it a notable 
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player at the regional level. However, it is far from creating a competitive threat to 
established financial centres. As a matter of fact, in terms of impact on the economic stability 
worldwide, its deformities and shortcomings may be more consequential.  
 
Further investigation into the destabilising potential of the emerging financial markets as well 
as their ability to mitigate the volatility of the global financial system presents itself as a 
promising avenue for future research. The policy implications of the findings reported in this 
article can be summed up in the view that further increase of the efficiency of these markets 
will demand changes that go beyond simple regulatory measures. Data presented in this 
article indicate that in Russia the key issues are to assure the growth of demand for financial 
assets and instruments by the residents, to build a strong domestic financial capability, to 
speed up monetisation of the economy, to promote diversification and demonopolisation of 
the economy, to address the institutional aspect of the economic reforms. 
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Figure 1 
Market capitalisation of listed companies as share of GDP in Russia (%) 
 
                  Source: World Bank 
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Figure 2 
Volatility of selected stock markets (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Mirkin, Y. (2011), Finansovoje buduscheje Rossii: extremumi, bumi, systemnije riski, GELEOS 
Publishing House, Moscow.  
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Table 1  
BRIC vs Developed Economies: Level of Monetisation* of National Economies (2009) 
Monetisation (%) Developed economies BRIC 
>200 Japan China 
>150 – 200 UK, Switzerland  
>100-150 Euro zone, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand 
 
>80-100 USA Brazil, India 
>60-80 Denmark, Sweden  
>40-60  Russia 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics Reports 
* calculated as Broad Money/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Growth of monetisation* of the BRIC economies in 1985-2009  
(current prices, % to the previous year) 
 1985 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2004 2007 2009 
Brazil Na 29,7 28,1 29,3 30,7 27,1 24,9 28,4 56,9 71,9 96,7 
Russia 53,6 17,4 16,2 17,8 23,4 21,7 21,4 25,9 31,6 44,5 49,5 
India Na 44,2 45,6 48,2 49,8 52,4 56,0 63,4 66,3 71,6 81,5 
China Na 103,8 111,4 122,7 133,6 146,4 152,2 147,1 151,6 156,8 180,9 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics Reports 
* calculated as Broad Money/GDP 
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Table 3  
Share of cash in money supply in 2009 
Cash/Money Supply 
(%) 
Developed economies BRIC 
0 - 2 UK  
>2 - 4 Australia, Canada, New Zealand  
>4 - 8 Japan, USA, Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland 
Brazil, China 
>8-10 Euro zone  
>10-15  India 
>15-20   
>20-25  Russia 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics Reports. Authors’ calculation: Broad Money/GDP, 
Current Prices, %; for euro zone:  M3/GDP, Current Prices, %. 
 
 
 
Table 4  
 
Interdependence between Market Capitalisation and Monetisation: 
Developed Economies vs BRIC in 2000 
Market 
capitalisatio
n/GDP 
(%) 
 
Monetisation (%) 
10-25 >25-40 >40-60 >60-80 >80- 100 > 100 
10-25 Russia    Austria  
25-40  Brazil India  New Zealand  
40-60   Denmark   China 
60-100   Italy  Australia, 
Greece  
Belgium, Ireland, 
Spain, Germany  
Japan 
> 100   UK, USA, 
Finland, 
Sweden  
Canada, 
France 
 Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland 
Sources: IMF Economic Outlook Database, (2001); IMF International Financial Statistics; FIBV  
Annual Report 2000; S&P/IFC Emerging Stock Markets Review (2000).  
*Monetisationn= Money + Quasi-Money/GDP, Current Prices, % 
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Table 5 
 The ratio of bank claims on other sectors and other depository corporations to GDP 
Bank Credits 
/GDP 
2008 
(%) 
Developed economies 
BRIC 
 
>300 Luxemburg  
>200-300 
Portugal, Netherlands, Spain, UK, 
Denmark, Ireland 
 
>150-200 
Malta, Hong Kong, New Zealand, 
Canada, Switzerland, Japan  
 
>100-150 
Sweden, Australia, Austria, 
France, Germany, Singapore, 
Korea, Italy, Belgium 
China 
 
>50-100 Israel, Greece, USA, Finland  
Brazil 
 
>10- 50  
Russia, India 
 
 
               Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF Economic Outlook Database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Net FDI inflow to GDP (2008) 
% Developed economies 
BRIC 
 
>16-18 
UK 
 
 
>18-20 Germany, USA, Sweden 
Brazil 
 
>20-22 
Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Italy,  
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Finland, 
Switzerland 
 
>22- 24 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
France, Japan 
 
>24 - 26 Iceland 
Russia 
 
>26 - 30 
Australia, Spain 
 
 
>30-40  
India 
 
>40  
China 
 
               Sources: IMF International Statistics. 
 
 
FINANCIAL DEPTH OF THE BRIC 
 
38 
 
Table 7 
 
BRIC vs Developed Economies: Inflation Dynamics 1995 – 2010 (% to the previous year).  
 
Countries/Years 1995 1996 
  
1997  
 
1998  
 
1999  
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
All developed countries* 
 
2,6 2,5 1,9 1,4 1,8 2,5 1,4 2,1 
All developing and 
emerging market 
countries*  
29,4 16,8 11,8 16,0 9,5 8,4 7,3 7,1 
Brazil 22,4 9,6 5,2 1,7 8,9 6,0 7,7 12,5 
China 10,1 7,0 0,4 -1,0 -0,9 0,9 0,12 -0,6 
India 11,3 10,1 5,3 16,3 0,0 3,2 5,2 4,0 
Russia 131,3 21,8 11,0 84,4 36,5 20,2 18,6 15,1 
         
Countries/Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
All developed countries 1,6 2,3 2,5 1,9 3,1 1,7 1,0 1,9 
All developing and 
emerging market 
countries 
5,9 6,3 5,7 5,7 7,6 8,1 5,3 6,7 
Brazil 9,3 7,6 5,7 3,1 4,5 5,9 4,3 5,9 
China 2,7 3,2 1,4 2,0 6,6 2,5 0,7 4,6 
India 2,9 4,6 5,3 6,7 5,5 9,7 15,0 9,5 
Russia 12,0 11,7 10,9 9,0 11,9 13,3 8,8 8,8 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database  
* Defined as in IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 2011. 
 
 
